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National Security, National
Origin, and the Constitution: 75
Years After EO9066
†

Geoffrey R. Stone†

I am honored to have the opportunity to address this issue, not
only because of its importance in American history, but also because
of the lessons we must learn from our own experience. It is essential
for us to remember, perhaps especially at the present moment, what
we as a nation are capable of. We must never forget that we are capable of doing things we might under other circumstances never imagine. We must always be vigilant and we must always remember that
“it” can happen here.
As history teaches, war fever often translates into xenophobia. To
some extent this is understandable, for in wartime individuals with a
connection to an enemy nation are, in fact, more likely to pose risks of
espionage, sabotage and subversion. But how a nation addresses these
concerns speaks volumes about its values, its sense of fairness, and its
willingness to judge individuals as individuals.

I
Japan’s attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, killed more
than 2,000 Americans and destroyed much of the Pacific fleet.1
Within the next few days, the United States declared war against
Japan, Germany, and Italy.2 Two months later, on February 19, 1942,
President Franklin Roosevelt signed Executive Order 9066, which
authorized the army “to designate the military areas from which any
or all persons may be excluded.”3 Although the words “Japanese” or

*

The following is based upon a transcript of Professor Stone’s presentation at
the symposium, National Security, National Origin, and the Constitution on
November 17, 2017, at Case Western Reserve University School of Law.

†

Edward H. Levi Distinguished Service Professor of Law, University of
Chicago Law School.

1.

Geoffrey R. Stone, Perilous Times: Free Speech in Wartime 286
(2004); Hawai’i Chronicles III: World War Two in Hawai’i, in Paradise
of the Pacific 37 (Bob Dye ed., 2000).

2.

Stone, supra note 1, at 286; Joint Resolution of December 8, 1941, Pub.
L. No. 77-328, 55 Stat 795.
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“Japanese American” never appeared in the order, it was understood
to apply only to persons of Japanese ancestry.4
Over the next eight months, almost 120,000 individuals of
Japanese descent were ordered to leave their homes in California,
Washington, Oregon, and Arizona.5 Two-thirds of these individuals
were American citizens, representing almost 90 percent of all Japanese
Americans.6 No charges were brought against these individuals. There
were no hearings. They did not know where they were going, how
long they would be detained, what conditions they would face, or
what fate would await them. They were ordered to bring only what
they could carry, and most families lost everything.7
On the orders of military police, these men, women, and children
were assigned to temporary detention camps, which had been set up
in converted racetracks and fairgrounds.8 Many families lived in
crowded horse stalls, often in unsanitary conditions.9 Barbed wire
fences and armed guard towers surrounded the compounds.10
From there, the internees were transported to one of ten permanent internment camps, which were located in isolated areas in windswept deserts or vast swamplands.11 Men, women, and children were
confined in overcrowded rooms with no furniture other than cots.
They once again found themselves surrounded by barbed wire and
military police, and there they remained for three years.12

3.

Stone, supra note 1, at 286 (quoting Exec. Order No. 9,066, 3 C.F.R. 1092
(Cum. Supp. 1943).

4.

Stone, supra note 1, at 286; 3 C.F.R. 1092–93.

5.

Stone, supra note 1, at 287; Fu-jen Chen & Su-lin Yu, Reclaiming the
Southwest: A Traumatic Space in the Japanese American Internment
Narrative, 47 J. Sw. 551, 552 (2005).

6.

Stone, supra note 1, at 287; accord Timothy P. Maga, Ronald Reagan
and Redress for Japanese-American Internment, 28 Presidential Stud.
Q. 606, 607 (1998).

7.

Stone, supra note 1, at 287; accord Maga, supra note 6, at 607.

8.

Stone, supra note 1, at 287; Jason Scott Smith, New Deal Public Works at
War: The WPA and Japanese American Internment, 72 Pac. Hist. Rev.
63, 73 (2003).

9.

Stone, supra note 1, at 287; Smith, supra note 8, at 73.

10.

Stone, supra note 1, at 287; accord Kristine C. Kuramitsu, Internment
and Identity in Japanese American Art, 47 Am. Q. 619, 622 (1995).

11.

Stone, supra note 1, at 287; accord Kuramitsu, supra note 10, at 620.

12.

Stone, supra note 1, at 287; Brian Masaru Hayashi, Democratizing
the Enemy: The Japanese American Internment 88, 91–92 (2004);
Kuramitsu, supra note 10, at 620.
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All of this was done even though there was not a single documented act of espionage, sabotage, or treasonable activity by any
American of Japanese descent.13
Why did this happen? Certainly, the days following Pearl Harbor
were dark days for the American spirit. Fear of possible Japanese
sabotage and espionage was rampant, and an outraged public felt an
understandable desire to lash out at those who had attacked the
nation.14 But this act was also very much an extension of more than a
century of racial prejudice against what was termed the “yellow peril.”15 Laws passed in the early 1900s denied immigrants from Japan
the right to become naturalized American citizens, to own land, and
to marry outside of their race.16 In 1924, immigration from Japan was
halted altogether.17
Nonetheless, in the immediate aftermath of Pearl Harbor, there
was no clamor for the mass internment of Japanese aliens or Japanese
Americans. Attorney General Francis Biddle assured the nation that
there would be “no indiscriminate, large-scale raids” on American citizens.18 The military governor of Hawaii assured Japanese Americans
that “there is no intention or desire on the part of federal authorities
to operate mass concentration camps.”19
Eleanor Roosevelt announced that “no law-abiding” Americans
“of any nationality would be discriminated against by the government”20 and Judge Jerome Frank—a distinguished federal judge and
13.

Stone, supra note 1, at 287; see Commission on Wartime Relocation
and Internment of Civilians, Personal Justice Denied 95–96 (1983)
[hereinafter CWRIC] (discussing the lack of congressional challenges to
Executive Order 9066 despite the absence of espionage evidence).

14.

Stone, supra note 1, at 287; CWRIC, supra note 13, at 67–68.

15.

Stone, supra note 1, at 287.

16.

Id.; Keith Aoki, No Right to Own: The Early Twentieth-Century Alien
Land Laws as a Prelude to Internment, 19 B.C. Third World L.J. 37,
38–39 (1998).

17.

Stone, supra note 1, at 287; see Terrace v. Thompson, 263 U.S. 197, 222
(1923) (upholding Washington Alien Land Law); Porerfield v. Webb, 263
U.S. 225, 233 (1923) (upholding California Alien Land Law); Ozawa v.
United States, 260 U.S. 178, 198 (1922) (upholding policy making Japanese
immigrants ineligible for naturalized citizenship); Peter Irons, Justice
at War 12 (1983).

18.

Stone, supra note 1, at 289; 1942 Att’y Gen. Ann. Rep. 14.

19.

Stone, supra note 1, at 289; Jane L. Scheiber, Internal Security, the
Japanese Problem, and the Kibei in World War II Hawaii, 35 U. Haw. L.
Rev. 415, 425 (2013).

20.

Stone, supra note 1, at 289; Greg Robinson, By Order of the
President: FDR and the Internment of Japanese Americans 71
(2001).
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close friend of President Franklin Roosevelt—observed that “[i]f ever
any Americans go to a concentration camp, American democracy will
go with them.”21 Moreover, on December 10, three days after Pearl
Harbor, FBI director J. Edgar Hoover reported that almost all the
persons of foreign ancestry that the FBI had identified as possible
threats to the national security had already been taken into custody.22
In the weeks that followed, however, a demand for the removal of
all persons of Japanese ancestry reached a crescendo along the West
Coast.23 The motivations for this outburst of anxiety were many and
complex. Certainly, it was fed by fears of a Japanese invasion.24 By
mid-January, California was awash in unfounded rumors of Japanese
sabotage and espionage. General John DeWitt, the top army commander on the West Coast, was determined not to be caught up short
as his counterpart had been in Hawaii. Several days after Pearl
Harbor, DeWitt reported as fact rumors that a squadron of enemy
airplanes had passed over California, that there was a planned uprising of 20,0000 Japanese Americans in San Francisco, and that
Japanese Americans were aiding submarines by signaling them from
the shore.25 The FBI and other government agencies promptly debunked all of those rumors as false.26
On January 2, the Joint Immigration Committee of the California
legislature issued a manifesto falsely charging that American citizens
of Japanese descent could “be called to bear arms for their Emperor”
and that Japanese-language schools were teaching students that
“every Japanese, wherever born or residing,” owed primary allegiance
to “his Emperor and to Japan.”27
Two days later, the newspaper columnist Damon Runyon erroneously reported that a radio transmitter had been discovered in a
rooming house that catered to Japanese residents. Who could

21.

Stone, supra note 1, at 289; Geoffrey Perrett, Days of Sadness,
Years of Triumph 217 (1985).

22.

Stone, supra note 1, at 290; Eric K. Yamamoto et al., Race, Rights
and Reparation: Law and the Japanese American Internment 97
(2001).

23.

Stone, supra note 1, at 290; Yamamoto et al., supra note 22, at 97–98.

24.

Stone, supra note 1, at 290; Irons, supra note 17, at 26–27.

25.

Stone, supra note 1, at 290; Neal Devins & Louis Fisher,
Democratic Constitution 206 (2d ed. 2015).

26.

Stone, supra note 1, at 290; Robinson, supra note 20, at 84–85; Irons,
supra note 17, at 26–27, 280–84.

27.

Stone, supra note 1, at 291; CWRIC, supra note 13, at 67–68.
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“doubt,” he asked, “the continued existence of enemy agents among
the Japanese population?”28
On January 14, Congressman Leland Ford insisted that the
United States place “all Japanese, whether citizens or not,” in “inland
concentration camps,” and the American Legion demanded the internment of all 93,000 individuals of Japanese extraction then living in
California.29
Such demands were further ignited by the January 25 report of
the Commission on Pearl Harbor, which was chaired by Supreme
Court Justice Owen Roberts.30 The report, which was hastily researched and written, erroneously asserted that persons of Japanese
ancestry in Hawaii had facilitated Japan’s attack on Pearl Harbor.31 A
few days later, a journalist, Henry McLemore, wrote a column in the
San Francisco Examiner calling for “the immediate removal of every
Japanese on the West Coast.”32 He added, “Personally, I hate the
Japanese. And that goes for all of them.”33
On February 4, California Governor Culbert Olson declared in a
radio address that it was “much easier” to determine the loyalty of
Italian and German aliens than of Japanese Americans.34 “All
Japanese people,” he added, “will recognize this fact.”35
In a similar vein, California’s attorney general and future Chief
Justice of the Supreme Court, Earl Warren, argued that whereas it
was relatively easy to find out which German or Italian Americans
were loyal, it was simply too difficult to determine which Americans
of Japanese ancestry were loyal and which were not.36 In Warren’s
words, when dealing with the Caucasian race, there were methods to
test their loyalty, but the Japanese were different, because “if the

28.

Stone, supra note 1, at 291; Ed Cray, Chief Justice: A Biography of
Earl Warren 117 (1997).

29.

Stone, supra note 1, at 291; Cray, supra note 28, at 117; Irons, supra
note 17, at 38.

30.

Stone, supra note 1, at 291; see generally Attack Upon Pearl Harbor
by Japanese Armed Forces, S. Doc. No. 77-159 (1942).

31.

Stone, supra note 1, at 291–92; Gary Y. Okihiro, The Columbia
Guide to Asian American History 116 (2001).

32.

Stone, supra note 1, at 292; Yamamoto et al., supra note 22, at 99.

33.

Stone, supra note 1, at 292; Yamamoto et al., supra note 22, at 99.

34.

Stone, supra note 1, at 292; Cray, supra note 28, at 117.

35.

Stone, supra note 1, at 292; Cray, supra note 28, at 117.

36.

Stone, supra note 1, at 292.
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Japs are free, no one will be able to tell a saboteur from any other
Jap.”37
General DeWitt initially resisted demands for “wholesale internment,” insisting that “we can weed [out] the disloyal [from] the loyal
and lock them up, if necessary.”38 In early January, he condemned the
idea of mass internment as “damned nonsense,” but as political pressure mounted, DeWitt changed his tune.39 In late January he stated,
“[t]he Japanese race is an enemy race . . . . [and] it makes no difference whether he is an American citizen, he is still a Japanese. This
was not true,” he emphasized, “of Germans and Italians. To the contrary,” he said, “[w]e needn’t worry about the Italians [and the
Germans.] But we must worry about the Japanese all the time until
he is wiped off the map.” After all, he added, “a Jap’s a Jap.”40
Similar sentiments and words were expressed throughout the
West Coast. But throughout this period, Attorney General Francis
Biddle strongly opposed internment as “ill-advised, unnecessary, and
unnecessarily cruel.”41 In late January, the California congressional
delegation attempted to pressure Biddle to support internment.
Biddle replied that he knew of no way in which “Japanese born in this
country could [constitutionally] be interned.”42
In the first two weeks of February, Biddle continued to argue the
point. On February 7, over lunch with the President, he told
Roosevelt that mass evacuation of Japanese Americans was inadvisable and impermissible, because “the army had offered ‘no reasons’
that would justify it as a military measure.”43

37.

Geoffrey R. Stone, It Can Happen Here: The 75th Anniversary of the
Japanese Internment (Part I), HuffPost (Nov. 19, 2017), https://www.
huffingtonpost.com/entry/it-can-happen-here-the-75th-anniversary-of-thejapanese_us_5a10b5e2e4b0e6450602eb9c [https://perma.cc/T2QW-QDGZ];
Jim Newton, Justice for All: Earl Warren and the Nation He
Made 136 (2006).

38.

Stone, supra note 1, at 292; Okihiro, supra note 31, at 115; Francis
Biddle, In Brief Authority 215 (1962).

39.

Stone, supra note 1, at 292; Biddle, supra note 38, at 215.

40.

Stone, supra note 1, at 292; Yamamoto et al., supra note 22, at 99;
CWRIC, supra note 13, at 66.

41.

Stone, supra note 1, at 293; Biddle, supra note 38, at 213; John Leo, An
Apology to Japanese Americans, Time (June 24, 2001), http://content.
time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,149131,00.html [https://perma.cc/
EMY7-99FV].

42.

Stone, supra note 1, at 293; Biddle, supra note 38, at 215.

43.

Geoffrey R Stone, War and Liberty, an American Dilemma: 1970
to the Present 71 (2007); Irons, supra note 17, at 53.
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Two days later, he wrote Secretary of War Henry Stimson that
the Department of Justice would not “under any circumstances” participate in the internment of American citizens on the basis of race.44
Biddle informed Stimson that J. Edgar Hoover had concluded that
the demand for mass evacuation was based on nothing more than
“public hysteria”45 that the FBI had already taken into custody all
suspected Japanese agents, and that Hoover himself had accused
General DeWitt of “getting a bit hysterical.”46
But the public clamor on the West Coast continued to build. The
American Legion, the Native Sons and Daughters of the Golden West,
the California Farm Bureau Federation, the Chamber of Commerce of
Los Angeles, and all the West Coast newspapers cried out for the
prompt removal of Japanese aliens and citizens alike.47
The attorney general of Washington chimed in that he favored
the removal of all “citizens of Japanese extraction” and the attorney
general of Idaho announced that all Japanese Americans should “be
put in concentration camps for the remainder of the war,” adding
pointedly, “we want to keep this a white man’s country.”48
On February 14, General DeWitt officially recommended that all
persons of Japanese extraction should be removed from “sensitive
areas.”49 Shortly thereafter, Attorney General Biddle spoke with
Roosevelt by phone. At the end of the conversation, a dejected Biddle
agreed that he would no longer resist the mass incarceration of
Japanese Americans.50 According to Biddle, his Justice Department
lawyers were “devastated.”51
A few days later, on February 19, President Franklin Roosevelt
signed Executive Order 9066.52 The matter was never discussed in the
cabinet, and the President did not consult his primary military advisors, the Joint Chiefs of Staff.53
44.

Stone, supra note 43, at 71; Biddle, supra note 38, at 218.

45.

Stone, supra note 43, at 71; Don Whitehead, The FBI Story: A
Report to the People 189 (1956).

46.

Stone, supra note 43, at 71; Richard Gid Powers, Secrecy and
Power: The Life of J. Edgar Hoover 249 (1987); Irons, supra note
17, at 28.

47.

Stone, supra note 43, at 72: Biddle, supra note 38, at 217.

48.

Stone, supra note 43, at 72; Cray, supra note 28, at 120; Irons, supra
note 17, at 72.

49.

Stone, supra note 43, at 72; Cray, supra note 28, at 120.

50.

Stone, supra note 43, at 72; Irons, supra note 17, at 62.

51.

Stone, supra note 43, at 72; Irons, supra note 17, at 62.

52.

Exec. Order No. 9,066, 3 C.F.R. 1092 (Cum. Supp. 1943).

53.

Stone, supra note 43, at 72–73; see Irons, supra note 17, at 56–65.
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The public rationale for the decision, laid out in General DeWitt’s
Final Report on the Evacuation of the Japanese from the West Coast,
was that time was of the essence and that the government had no reasonable way to distinguish loyal from disloyal persons of Japanese
descent.54
This report has rightly been condemned as a travesty.55 It relied
upon unsubstantiated and even fabricated assertions; the FBI had, indeed, already taken into custody those individuals it suspected of potential subversion, and two weeks before Roosevelt signed the
Executive Order, General Mark Clark and Admiral Harold Stark
testified before a House committee that the danger of a Japanese attack on the West Coast was “effectively nil.”56 The argument of military necessity was simply not credible.

II
Why, then, did Franklin Roosevelt sign the Executive Order?
Robert Jackson, who had served as Roosevelt’s Attorney General
before being appointed to the Supreme Court, once observed that
Roosevelt was a “strong skeptic of legal reasoning” and, despite his
reputation, was not a “strong champion of civil rights. He had the
tendency,” Jackson said, “to think in terms of right and wrong, instead of legal and illegal. [And b]ecause he thought his motives were
always good for the things that he wanted to do, he found difficulty in
thinking that there could be legal limitations on them.”57
Jackson’s successor, Attorney General Francis Biddle, also speculated about why Roosevelt signed Executive Order 9,066. “I do not
think,” he said, that “he was much concerned with the gravity or implications of this step. He was never theoretical about things. The
military might be wrong. But they were fighting the war [and p]ublic
opinion was on their side,”58 so “there was no question of any

54.

Stone, supra note 43, at 73; John DeWitt, Final Report: Japanese
Evacuation from the West Coast, at vii (1942).

55.

Stone, supra note 43, at 73; Lorraine K. Bannai, Enduring
Conviction: Fred Korematsu and His Quest for Justice 85 (2015).

56.

Stone, supra note 1, at 295; Robinson, supra note 20, at 110.

57.

Stone, supra note 1, at 295; Robert Jackson, That Man: An
Insider's Portrait of Franklin D. Roosevelt 74 (2003).

58.

Stone, supra note 1, at 296; Geoffrey R. Stone, It Can Happen Here: The
75th Anniversary of the Japanese Internment, Part II, HuffPost (Nov.
19, 2017, 6:34 PM), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/it-can-happenhere-the-75th-anniversary-of-the-japanese_us_5a121186e4b023121e0e9439
[https://perma.cc/YZ3L-V4PN]; Biddle, supra note 38, at 219.
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substantial opposition [to the order].”59 Undoubtedly, public opinion
played a key role in the thinking of both the military and the
President.
In fact, there was almost no public protest of Roosevelt’s decision.
Even most civil liberties groups stayed relatively quiet. Although
Roosevelt explained the order in terms of military necessity, there is
little doubt that domestic politics played a key role in his thinking,
particularly because 1942 was an election year and Roosevelt was
hardly immune to politics.
As the legal historian Peter Irons has observed, the internment
decision “illustrates the dominance of politics over law” in a wartime
setting.60 In his speculation about Roosevelt’s thinking, Biddle noted
that, “ultimately, the Supreme Court must decide the issue.”61 And,
indeed, so it did, in a series of critical decisions addressing the constitutionality of different aspects of the military orders.

III
In June [of] 1943, the Supreme Court handed down its decision in
Hirabayashi v. United States.62 Gordon Hirabayashi was born in 1918
in Auburn, Washington.63 His father ran a roadside fruit market.64 His
parents were pacifists.65 He attended the University of Washington,
where he assumed a leadership role in the YMCA and the Japanese
Students Club.66 In the summer of 1940, he traveled to New York
City to attend a program at Columbia University, where he participated in passionate debates about pacifism and social activism.67
After President Roosevelt signed Executive Order 9066,
Hirabayashi, with the assistance of a local legislator and the local
ACLU, decided to challenge the constitutionality of General DeWitt’s
curfew order by intentionally violating the order and then turning
59.

Stone, supra note 1, at 296; Stone, supra note 58; Biddle, supra note 38,
at 219.

60.

Stone, supra note 1, at 296; Stone, supra note 58; Irons, supra note 17, at
42.

61.

Stone, supra note 1, at 297; Stone, supra note 58; Biddle, supra note 38,
at 219.

62.

Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943).

63.

Stone, supra note 1, at 297; Hirabayashi, 320 U.S. at 84.

64.

Stone, supra note 1, at 297; Irons, supra note 17, at 89.

65.

Stone, supra note 1, at 297; Irons, supra note 17, at 89.

66.

Stone, supra note 1, at 297; Irons, supra note 17, at 89.

67.

Stone, supra note 1, at 297; Irons, supra note 17, at 89.
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himself in to the FBI.68 The case made its way to the Supreme Court
and Chief Justice Harlan Fiske Stone wrote the opinion of the Court
upholding Hirabayashi’s conviction.69
Although Stone observed privately that he was shocked that the
United States had “subjected U.S. citizens to this treatment,” he
nonetheless upheld the constitutionality of the curfew.70 “The war
power of the national government,” he wrote, “is the power to wage
war successfully. We cannot say that the war-making branches of the
government did not have ground for believing that in a critical hour
such persons constituted a menace to the national defense and
safety.”71
Although conceding that “distinctions between citizens solely because of their ancestry are by their very nature odious to a free people,” Stone nonetheless argued that,
it by no means follows that, in dealing with the perils of war,
Congress and the Executive are precluded from taking into
account those facts and circumstances which are relevant to
measures for our National Defense and which may, in fact, place
citizens of one ancestry in a different category from others.72

Justice Frank Murphy informed his colleagues that he intended to
dissent, arguing that the guaranties of the Bill of Rights are not
suspended by the mere existence of a state of war.73 Justice Felix
Frankfurter, however, persuaded Murphy not to dissent, arguing that
it would undermine “the great reputation of this Court” if Murphy
were to accuse his colleagues of betraying the Constitution and “behaving like the enemy.”74
The following year, in Korematsu v. United States, 75 the Supreme
Court upheld the Exclusion Order by a vote of six to three.76 Fred
Korematsu was born in 1919 in Oakland, California.77 After graduating from high school, he worked as a shipyard welder. In June 1941,
68.

Stone, supra note 1, at 298; Stone, supra note 58.

69.

Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 83, 105 (1943).

70.

Stone, supra note 37; Irons, supra note 17, at 232.

71.

Hirabayashi, 320 U.S. at 93, 99.

72.

Id. at 100.

73.

Stone, supra note 37; see also Irons, supra note 17, at 246.

74.

Stone, supra note 37; see also Irons, supra note 17, at 246.

75.

323 U.S. 214 (1944).

76.

Id. at 224.

77.

Stone, supra note 43, at 76; Irons, supra note 17, at 93–94.
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he sought to enlist in the U.S. Navy, but was turned down because of
gastric ulcers.78 On May 30, 1942, the police in California stopped and
questioned Korematsu, who was then walking down the street with
his girlfriend.79 He said he was of Spanish-Hawaiian origin.80
The police took him in for questioning, and he then admitted his
real name and nationality.81 He explained that the rest of his family
had been sent to an internment center, located in a converted racetrack, but that he had not reported, because he was trying to earn
enough money to move to the Midwest with his girlfriend, who was
Italian.82 He maintained that General DeWitt’s Exclusion Order was
unlawful.83 His case too made it to the Supreme Court.84
Justice Hugo Black delivered the opinion for the majority.85 “We
cannot reject as unfounded,” he said, “the judgment of the military
authorities that there were disloyal members of the Japanese American population, whose number and strength could not be precisely
and quickly ascertained. We are not unmindful of the hardships imposed upon a large group of American citizens, but hardships,” he
wrote, “are part of war, and war is an aggregation of hardships.”86
“All citizens alike, both in and out of uniform, feel the impact of
war in greater or lesser measure,” he added, “and to cast this case into outlines of racial prejudice confuses the issue. Korematsu was not
excluded from the West Coast because of any hostilities of his race,
but because the military authorities decided that the urgency of this
situation demanded that all citizens of Japanese ancestry be
segregated from the area. We cannot,” he concluded, “by availing ourselves of the calm perspective of hindsight, now say that at that time
these actions were unjustified.”87
The three dissenting justices were Owen Roberts, Frank Murphy,
and Robert Jackson.88 Justice Roberts argued that it was patently
78.

Stone, supra note 43, at 76; Irons, supra note 17, at 94.

79.

Stone, supra note 43, at 76; Irons, supra note 17, at 93.

80.

Stone, supra note 37; Irons, supra note 17, at 93.

81.

Stone, supra note 37; Irons, supra note 17, at 94–95.

82.

Stone, supra note 37; Irons, supra note 17, at 94–95.

83.

Stone, supra note 37.

84.

See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).

85.

Id. at 215.

86.

Stone, supra note 37; Stone, supra note 43, at 76; Korematsu, 323 U.S. at
218–19.

87.

Stone, supra note 37; Stone, supra note 43, at 76; Korematsu, 323 U.S. at
219, 223–24.

88.

Stone, supra note 43, at 77; Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 225, 233, 242.
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unconstitutional for the government to insist that individuals submit
“to imprisonment in a concentration camp” for no reason other than
their “ancestry.”89
Justice Murphy wrote a particularly angry dissent. “No adequate
reason is given,” he said, “for the failure to treat these Japanese
Americans on an individual basis by holding investigations and hearings to separate the loyal from the disloyal, as was done in the case of
German and Italian individuals.”90 “Moreover,” he added, “there was
no adequate proof that the Federal Bureau of Investigation and military and naval intelligence services did not have the espionage and
sabotage situation well in hand during this period.”91 The government,
Murphy charged, had gone beyond “the very brink of constitutional
power” and had fallen into the “ugly abyss of racism.”92

IV
On December 17, 1944, the Roosevelt Administration announced
that it would end the internment and release the internees.93 There
had been a lengthy struggle within the Administration about when to
end the internment. In December of 1943, Attorney General Biddle
strenuously argued for the immediate release of all loyal Japanese
Americans.94 In May 1944, Secretary of War Stimson made it clear to
Roosevelt that the internment could be ended “without any danger to
defense considerations.”95
Nonetheless, the President chose to postpone the decision, explaining that “the whole problem, for the sake of internal quiet,
should be handled gradually.”96 In plain truth, Roosevelt did not want
to release the internees until after the 1944 presidential election, because such a decision might upset voters on the West Coast.97
89.
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226 (Roberts, J., dissenting).

90.
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241 (Murphy, J., dissenting).
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241(Murphy, J., dissenting).
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In the years immediately after World War II, attitudes about the
Japanese internment began to shift. In the Evacuation Claims Act of
1948, Congress authorized compensation for specific property losses
suffered by the internees.98 Several factors spurred the enactment of
this legislation, including the growing sense of guilt and international
condemnation of the internment.99 The process for obtaining compensation was agonizingly slow, however. By 1958, only 26,000 internees
had received any compensation.100 Moreover, as one critic acidly observed, “[t]he goal of the program was not to offer reparations for the
moral, constitutional, reputational, and dignitary wrongs done to
Japanese Americans, but only to compensate them for lost ‘pots and
pans.’”101
Many participants in the Japanese internment reflected on the
roles they played. Some knew at the time that internment was unconstitutional and immoral. In April of 1942, Milton Eisenhower—Dwight
Eisenhower’s brother—who was the national director of the War
Relocation Administration, which was responsible for running the detention camps, lamented that “When this war is over, we, as Americans, are going to regret the injustices” we have done.102 Two months
later, as a matter of principle, he resigned his position.103
Francis Biddle, who had vigorously and consistently opposed internment, continued to deplore the government’s action.104 In 1962, he
wrote that internment had “subjected Americans to the shame of
being classed as enemies of their native country without any evidence
indicating disloyalty.”105 He observed that, unlike citizens of German
and Italian descent, “Japanese Americans were treated as ‘untouchables,’ as a group that could not be trusted and had to be [imprisoned] only because they were of Japanese descent.”106
In 1974, former Chief Justice Earl Warren, who had played a
pivotal role in the Japanese internment as California’s attorney
98.

Stone, supra note 43, at 79.

99.

Id.

100. Id.
101. Id.; Yamamato et. al, supra note 22, at 240–41.
102. Stone, supra note 43, at 79; S.P. Mackenzie, What Happened Was Wrong,
in Repicturing the Second World War 109 (Michael Paris ed., 2007).
103. Stone, supra note 43, at 79; Robert Aitken & Marilyn Aitken, Japanese
American Internment, 37 Litig. 59, 60 (2011).
104. Stone, supra note 43, at 79.
105. Id.; Raymond F. Gregory, Norman Thomas: The Great Dissenter
198 (2008).
106. Stone, supra note 43, at 79–80; Gregory, supra note 105, at 198.
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general, conceded that Japanese internment was “not in keeping with
our American concept of freedom and the rights of citizens.”107 In later
years, he admitted privately that he regretted his own actions in the
matter.108
Moreover, the Court’s decisions in Hirabayashi and Korematsu
became constitutional pariahs. Indeed, the Supreme Court has never
cited either decision with approval of its result.
Over the years, the immorality of the Japanese American internment has continued to reverberate. As part of the celebration of the
Bicentennial of the Constitution in 1976, President Gerald Ford issued a Presidential Proclamation in which he acknowledged that we
must recognize “our national mistakes as well as our national achievements.”109 “February 19,” he noted, “is the anniversary of a sad day in
American history,” for it was “on that date in 1942, that the
Executive Order 9066 was issued.”110 Ford observed that “we now
know what we should have known then,” that the evacuation and internment of loyal Japanese Americans was “wrong.”111
In 1983, the Commission on Wartime Relocation and Internment
of Civilians, which Congress had created to review the implementation of Executive Order 9066, unanimously concluded that the factors that shaped the internment decision “were race prejudice, war
hysteria and a failure of political leadership,” not military necessity.112
That same year, Fred Korematsu and Gordon Hirabayashi filed
petitions to have their convictions set aside for “manifest injustice.”113
A year later, federal Judge Marilyn Patel granted Korematsu’s petition.114 Patel found that in its presentation of evidence to the federal
courts in the course of Korematsu’s prosecution and appeal, including
in the Supreme Court, the government had “knowingly and intentionally failed to disclose critical information that directly contradicted key statements on which the government had asked the Courts
107. Stone, supra note 43, at 81; Earl Warren, The Memoirs of Earl
Warren 149 (1977).
108. Proclamation No. 4,417, 41 Fed. Reg. 7,741 (Feb. 19, 1976).
109. Id.
110. Tetsuden Kashima, Judgment Without Trial: Japanese American
Imprisonment During World War II 212 (2003).
111. Joel B. Grossman, The Japanese American Cases and the Vagaries of
Constitutional Adjudication in Wartime: An Institutional Perspective, 19
U. Haw. L. Rev. 649, 665 (1997).
112. Id. at 666.
113. Stone, supra note 43, at 83; Korematsu v. United States, 584 F. Supp.
1406, 1417 (N.D. Cal. 1984).
114. Roger Daniels, Prisoners Without Trial 100 (1993).
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to rely.”115 Judge Patel observed that the Supreme Court’s decision in
Korematsu “stands as a constant caution that in times of war or declared military necessity, our institutions must be vigilant in protecting constitutional guarantees.”116
Three years later, a federal Court of Appeals vacated Gordon
Hirabayashi’s conviction.117 In an opinion by Judge Mary Schroeder,
the court found serious deceit in the United States’ presentation of its
case to the Supreme Court.118 Judge Schroeder found that the original
version of Judge DeWitt’s final report, which was designed to justify
the military orders, did not “purport to rest on any military exigency,
but instead declared unequivocally that because of traits peculiar to
citizens of Japanese ancestry, it would be impossible to separate the
loyal from the disloyal.”119 When officials of the War Department
received DeWitt’s report in early 1942, they ordered him to excise the
racist overtones and to add statements of military necessity.120 Copies
of the original report were then burned.121
When officials of the Department of Justice were preparing to
argue the Hirabayashi case in the Supreme Court, they sought all
materials relevant to General DeWitt’s decision-making, but the War
Department did not disclose to the Justice Department the original
version of the report.122 Judge Schroeder found that, given the importance the justices attached to the government’s claims of military necessity in Hirabayashi and Korematsu, “[t]he reasoning of the
Supreme Court would probably have been profoundly affected had it
been advised of the suppression of evidence that would have established unequivocally the real reason for the Exclusion Order.”123
In the last year of this presidency, Ronald Reagan signed the Civil
Liberties Act of 1988, which officially declared that the Japanese internment was a “grave injustice,” explained that the program of
exclusion and internment had been “motivated largely by racial
prejudice,” and offered an official Presidential apology and reparations
to each of the Japanese American internees who had suffered

115. Grossman, supra note 111, at 667.
116. Stone, supra note 43, at 83; Stone, supra note 37.
117. Hirabayashi v. United States, 828 F.2d 591, 598 (9th Cir. 1987).
118. Stone, supra note 43, at 83; Hirabayashi, 828 F.2d at 598.
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120. Stone, supra note 1, at 306.
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“discrimination, deprivation of liberty, loss of property, and personal
humiliation at the hands of the U.S. government.”124

V
I would like to close with a final note about Fred Korematsu. For
the rest his life, Korematsu continued to challenge what he saw as the
abuse of government authority.125 In 1998, President Bill Clinton honored him with the Presidential Medal of Freedom, the highest honor
the United States can bestow upon a citizen.126 In the fall of 2003, to
my astonishment, Fred Korematsu contacted me.
The Supreme Court was about to hear the case of Rasul v.
Bush.127 Rasul and others had been captured during the United States
invasion of Afghanistan after the 9/11 attack on the United States.128
Rasul claimed that he was not a member of the Taliban, but was with
them at the time of his capture because he was being held by them as
a prisoner.129 The government designated Rasul an enemy combatant,
however, and shipped him off to the military base in Guantanamo
Bay.130
The Bush Administration denied Rasul access to counsel, the
right to a trial, and any knowledge of the charges against him.131 A
group of independent lawyers then brought suit in federal court claiming that this procedure violated Rasul’s constitutional rights.132 When
the case made its way to the Supreme Court of the United States,
Fred Korematsu reached out to me, because I had recently published
a book on civil liberties in wartime.133 He asked me to write an amicus
curiae brief to the Supreme Court in his name. It was, as you might
expect, a great honor for me to have had the opportunity to do so.

124. Stone, supra note 1, 307; Civil Liberties Act of 1988, Pub L. No. 100-383,
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Fred Korematsu died a few months after the Supreme Court ruled
in favor of Rasul, holding that the United States government had
violated his right to petition the federal courts for a writ of habeas
corpus.134 I would like to think that Fred Korematsu’s name on that
brief served powerfully to remind the Justices of the Court’s own past
failures and inspired them not to make the same mistake again.

134. Rasul, 542 U.S. at 484.
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